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А ннотация
В статье происходит обращение к тому, как Платон понимал природу философского знания, как 
он представлял себе развитие и существование философии. Задача исследования состоит в том, 
чтобы зафиксировать определенные сценарии реализации философского знания, проводимые Пла­
тоном и попробовать сопоставить эти сценарии с тем, каким образом развивается современная 
практика преподавания философии. Отвечая на вопрос «что значит, по Платону, быть философом 
и пользоваться философией» позволяет также уловить существенные черты его учения в целом, 
которые можно назвать «платонизмом».
A bstract
In order to understand how and in what direction, generally speaking, philosophical knowledge, to say -  
usual knowledge for every teacher o f philosophy, is developing, I propose to refer to Plato's view on the 
development and life o f the philosophical knowledge which is can be taught. Can we fix certain scenarios 
o f implementation o f philosophy by Plato and his Academy, and see, if  we succeed, o f course, in what 
way modern practice o f teaching philosophy, that has a direct relationship to the majority o f teachers of 
philosophy, is developing? So, I may formulate the main aim of this article as follows: this article can be 
considered as an attempt to appeal to the understanding o f Plato about the nature o f philosophical 
knowledge. Plato’s view on the nature o f philosophy teaching allows to capture the essential features of 
his teaching in general, which are might be called «platonism».
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T h e  f i r s t  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  k n o w l e d g e 1 a c c o r d i n g  t o  P la t o  is  u n i v e r s a l  e m p i r i c i s m
To clarify the phrase «universal empiricism», referring to  the Platonic philosophy, I suggest 
recollecting here the words used by A. Trendelenburg in the introduction to  his «Logical Investiga­
tions». A. Trendelenburg is a philosopher, w ho is m ore often associated w ith the revival o f the Ar-
1 There is a plenty amount of works, devoted to the Plato's view on the nature of philosophical knowledge. Here, I 
will point out two works, from which we learn about the nature of philosophy. On the philosophical knowledge, 
which is opposed to mathematical, rational and discursive knowledge see: Messiats S.V. Plato's Concept of Discur­
sive Knowledge [Messiats, 2011]; on the philosophical knowledge (philosophical truth) in its opposition to the non­
philosophical truth see: W oolf R. Truth as a Value in Plato’s R ep u b lic  [Woolf, 2009].
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• 2 •istotle philosophy rather than w ith the Platonism  . He believes that a philosopher should act as a 
scholar, w ho studies particular things in detail, than to be involved in the pursuit o f  some general 
concept, w hich has been already studied by his predecessors and was given a description. A  study 
o f particular things suits the Platonic attitude towards the philosophy; it corresponds to  the first, 
basic and obligatory condition o f philosophical com prehension, w hen we talk  about Plato.
A ttentive reading o f the dialogue «Ion» can m ake us reconsider the personality o f Plato: 
this new  philosopher will speak not as a dream er o f things o f  general property, w ho is far from 
empiricism  and com m on people activities, but will acquire a new  image. The question o f  the dia­
logue «Ion» is as following: which kind o f  poetry (it means, a kind o f  speech) is the best? W ho is 
the person w ho defines the criteria for «best» and w ho can judge it? Undoubtedly, this person is 
that w ho is m ore w ell-grounded in poetry. Generally speaking, the specialist in a particular sphere 
is one w ho is the m ost knowledgeable in this subject. How ever, there are some people, w ho con­
sider them selves to be experts, in case o f poetry -  rhapsodies. They draw  attention to  one particular 
poet, w hom  they think to be the best one. Then in case o f philosophy, i f  w e continue the logic o f 
Plato, such people can choose their favorite philosophical doctrine, focusing their attention at one 
particular philosophical view. Plato explains it w ith the help o f «divine» connection, «obsession». 
It m eans a rhapsody (or any person w ho announces h im self to  be a specialist in a sphere) is ob­
sessed, he judges the poetry considering his own connection w ith a poet, w hich is gifted by Gods. 
B ut w hat is exactly valuable about these words generated by the divine bonds? A ccording to  Plato, 
these words are o f  no value2 3. The obsessed will estim ate these words w orse than that person w ho is 
aware o f  the empirical properties and its details constituting a speech (or estim ate the poetry o f 
H om er as in the «Ion» worse). A  coachman, a doctor, a fisherm an are the exact judges o f  the quali­
ty o f  speech, the speech which is connected to carriages, health, fishing.
It happens in different spheres, not only in case o f  H om er and poetry. Tw o different kinds 
o f  «art» exist: to  be obsessed (or to rely on the generalized, em otional and m ystical know ledge) 
and have concrete knowledge. A nd P lato criticizes any attem pt o f  the person having general (in 
fact -  trivial) know ledge to  prove his significance and persuade everybody that he is good at eve­
ry particular subject. H ence, the rhapsody in the «Ion», despite the high se lf -  esteem  o f  his art 
(and any other person w ho will, like a rhapsody, estim ate the in terlocutor’s speech), w o n ’t be o f 
any value, he will be not a m outhpiece o f  the truth, bu t the obsessed, and thus he is not allow ed 
to proclaim  h im self an expert.
P lato teaches that one can get this or that know ledge only from  those teachers w ho are 
tem pted by it. Essentially, P lato declares the value o f  the narrow  professional education passing 
from  a teacher to  a student. G etting know ledge about m usic, for instance, will be the m ost useful 
if  this know ledge is acquired from  the best m usician w ho doesn’t spare his\her m oral forces on 
some other kinds o f  know ledge. H ow ever, in m any m odern educational hum anitarian program s 
and classes such P lato covenant is not executed. Interdisciplinary classes established in accord­
ance w ith the general background o f  hum anitarian know ledge are characterized by the vagueness 
o f  its content, in such classes we can talk  about com pletely different things.
That m eans that the necessary condition o f  teaching philosophy is a synthesis o f  «clarity 
w ith both depth and appropriate elaboration», as Hegel w rote in  his letter in 1816. It turn, the 
thought o f  the P la to ’s specifics is presented in various P la to ’s dialogues. H ere is one o f  the defi­
nitions o f  philosopher in the dialogue «The Republic»: philosopher is the one «w ho can view  
things in their connection» (VII, 537с), that is, the one w ho is able to  study all the things ex ist­
ent. The philosopher of «The Republic» is not the one focused on the com prehension of «light» 
(that is, it is not the person o f  hum anitarian turn  o f  m ind and w ho w as bad in m athem atics), the
2 A detailed study of the relationship between the teaching o f Trendelenburg and the teachings of Plato and 
Aristotle, and the ancient philosophy in general, is presented in R.A. Gromov’s article [Gromov, 2012].
3 Hegel tells us, as it were in his reflections on the teaching of philosophy at universities, that «the whole 
can truly be grasped only when one works through the parts», and this thought shows us the platonic character of his 
philosophy [Hegel, 1984].
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philosopher is the one w ho being focused on «the light» has an opportunity to  see it in every­
thing, and every th ing in this light. That is, in fact, it is the one w ho studies everything and the 
one w ho is gradually com ing to  the essence o f  light.
D oes it always happen so, that a cognitive attention to  the details o f  the essence is a char­
acteristic feature o f  the philosophy teaching practice (or the m ovem ent process o f  free philosoph­
ical thought)? «A lthough the tim e o f  categorical system s o f  creativeness is obviously over», -  it 
is w ritten in one o f  the textbooks, and after such an announcem ent w e expect the further devel­
opm ent o f  research focus on the attention to  the particulars, still, how ever, in a few  paragraphs o f 
this textbook one can learn and study the general theory o f  existence and other «basics o f  general 
philosophy», that is, all those w hich im ply laws, universalization and generalization.
T he  second  fe a tu re  o f th e  p h ilo soph ica l know ledge acco rd in g  
to  P la to  is th e  th eo re tic a l re jec tio n  fro m  u n p re p a re d , m onosy llab ic  
fo rm u la tio n  ob jec ts o f ideal o rd e r
The next stage o f  the m ovem ent in a philosophical way, proposed by Plato, is the aw are­
ness o f  the criteria o f  revision o f  statem ents and conclusions according to  their property.W e will 
not find in  Plato clear instructions for the differentiation o f  the genuine philosophical statem ents 
and speeches from  ju s t seem to be so, however, in the w hole corpus o f  his w orks it is easy to  see 
the difference. A  philosophical statem ent, in contrast to  the attem pts o f  interlocutors o f  Socrates 
(and in som e cases -  and personally P latonic Socrates) to  identify the phenom ena o f  perfect o r­
der, will possess a w illingness to  refuse the up-to-the-m inute denotation o f  the true state o f  af­
fairs, will contain sem antic duality, to  encom pass the contradictions that have been sm oothed or 
unnoticed previously.
The m ost dem onstrative this circum stance is expressed in the early dialogues o f  Plato, 
w hich have a certain specificity. Sharing the know n point o f  v iew  on the nature o f  the early dia­
logues, according to  w hich previously in them  there is the fram ing o f  the teaching about the ide ­
as up, I  th ink that the m ain  goal o f  the early dialogues o f  P lato is the foundation that the idea 
prevails over the fact, and it is conveyed by the fact that you cannot cognize one or another phe­
nom enon outside o f  the ideal world. In the early dialogues «is searched som ething com m on, that 
in all this “ self-identical”» [Losev, 1993, p.141].
The early dialogues have m etaphysical them es according to  the character, have questions 
o f  the «ideal» order. O f course, you m ust reckon in that this topic is expressed in the early d ia­
logues m ore like a w orldview ing directive, than a specifically posed theoretical problem . G ener­
ally speaking, the researchers o f  P lato  do not link  the topic o f  the early dialogues w ith the search 
o f  a certain phenom enon or a private thing. There is also a v iew  that the result o f  the early d ia­
logues o f  P lato is not the definition o f  any occurrence, phenom enon, bu t vice versa, identifying 
w hat this phenom enon cannot be [Greek Thought: A  Guide to  Classical K now ledge, 2000]. I be­
lieve that the early dialogues o f  P lato encom pass the dem onstration o f  the fact that the phenom e­
na, w hich are defined in the dialogues, are o f  such nature that it is possible to  understand them  
only by using a special m ethod o f  exam ination, -  that is, due to  philosophy.
In the later dialogue «Sym posium » none o f  the interlocutors o f  Socrates is not w rong in 
the literal sense o f  the w ords, ju s t speeches o f  Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryxim achus, A ristophanes 
and A gathon about love are not com plete, are not m eaningful, because these people are not ph i­
losophers. The interlocutors o f  Socrates tried to  present Eros as a certain phenom enon w ith its 
own characteristics, approxim ating to  such its descriptions as: the h ighest good for the hum an 
life; sincere and intelligent love; such phenom enon w hich contains the things o f  the physical 
universe in order. B ut all these speeches have been attem pts to  define the phenom enon o f  ideal 
property w ithout philosophy. The difference o f  the inferences o f  these people is intended, I think, 
to  em phasize the fact that Love is such a beginning, w hich is m ade o f  «transcendent» things, and 
therefore cannot be expressed in one point o f  view. Only the speech o f  Socrates really expressed
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the idea o f  «Eros» presenting it as an interm ediary betw een im m ortals and m ortals, reflecting the 
m iddle, the interm ediate nature o f  the ideas.
P la to ’s com prehension o f  ideas does not im ply their fast and direct cognition, and their 
full detection for the participants o f  the dialogue. The prim ary value o f  the study o f  philosophy is 
to create a proper cognitive guideline, w hich, im m ediately raises the question o f  the protection o f 
the guideline from  sophistry and m eaningless oratory; and then later study o f  philosophy be­
com es the value that is achieved through philosophizing som e specific know ledge about the ide­
as. Ideas should be to  com prehend, bu t it is necessary to  understand that the reality o f  ideas can­
not be quickly analyzed, there is a lot o f  evidence in Plato 's texts approving this fact. S tarting 
directly from  the «A pology o f  Socrates», P lato 's Socrates confirm s that there is no ready-m ade 
know ledge; he could not prom ise any o f  his students because know ledge itse lf cannot be given. 
A nd in the «Second letter» (314a-b), although not all researchers considered it genuine, Plato 
w rote o f  m any years o f  «prolonged labour» anticipate getting o f  philosophical knowledge.
Still in literature can be found some reasoning, explaining Plato 's refusal to  issue finished 
form ulations o f  ontological positions «dualistic ontology»4, w rong view  o f  the m atter, the irra­
tionality and even fancy o f  his teachings [Racionalism  i Irracionalism  v Antichnoj Filosofii, 
2010] rather than  Socratic m anner to  engage in dialogue and features o f  academ ic teaching p rac­
tice. In this case Plato 's dialogues are convenient m aterial for interpretation, can be easy included 
in the perspective o f  interest o f  the author. R eflections on the problem  o f  the struggle betw een 
idealism  and m aterialism , any other m etaphilosophical problem  -  will set a certain course o f  in ­
terpretation o f  Plato 's dialogues. Indeed, in the capable hands any tex t can w ork on defending its 
own philosophical concepts.
For a large num ber o f  m odern dom estic philosophers-experts question o f  w hat is 
know ledge and w hat w e know, it is also extrem ely im portant. Som e o f  the researchers, in re ­
sponse to  this question, rem ain in the fram ew ork o f  the w ork on the problem s associated w ith the 
«fundam ental question o f  philosophy», which, although has changed its form ulation, bu t re ­
m ained a universal and «basic». A nd i f  you take the side o f  the P latonic vision o f  being o f  ph ilo ­
sophical approach to  know ledge, leaving aside in form ulated by som eone before m atrix  o f  all 
possible (and therefore -  it is easy to  foresee) philosophical problem s, it becom es clear that the 
real philosophical problem s arise from  the analysis o f  different possible interpretations o f  the 
philosophical text. They exist at the junction  o f  different types o f  descriptions o f  speculative u n i­
verse, these problem s are not im m ediately ready to  use. To understand the specificity o f  ph ilo ­
sophical know ledge should be a clear understanding o f  w hat w as originally a philosopher im plic­
itly renounces claim s to  describe the w orld o f  the object as it really is; philosopher engaged in 
understanding a w orld that does not tolerate the w ording and definitions «m ajor issues».
T h e  th ird  fe a tu re  o f p h ilo soph ica l know ledge acco rd in g  
to  P la to  is cogn ition  o f th e  selfness
There is a big question for the researchers: w hat exactly did Plato teach his students at the 
A cadem y? A  w idespread notion about Plato academ ic activities is the idea that Plato taught both 
philosophy, and m athem atics5. The idea o f academ ic symbiosis o f  m athem atics and philosophy, 
put forw ard and realized by Plato, has a long history and it keeps quite stable even in the twentieth 
century: «Two o f  the three schools o f ancient Greek philosophy, Ionian and Pythagorean, consisted 
exclusively o f  geom etricians - and references to  E leatic’s interest in geom etry can also be found 
quite often. Plato was a great figure in the history o f both subjects» [Peirce, 2001, p.102].
4 Here, the «dualism» of the philosophy of Plato is not connected with the dispute about the first principles 
of his philosophy, which is consistuting the sufficient point of the Academy’s activites after his death, and occup y- 
ing a central place in neo-Platonic discussions on the Oneness and the first principles. We see here a simple opposi­
tion between the world of Ideas and the material world of objects.
5 Here, the «mathematics» means all mathematical disciplines taken in one coherent whole, which includes 
the «calculation» and the «geometry», like Plato describes in «The Republic».
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One can hold the opinion, represented in the w ell-know n w ork by L.Y. Zhm ud [Zhm ud’, 
1996] and according to  w hich Plato, at best, taught dialectics at the A cadem y, w hile exact sci­
ences and m athem atics w ere taught by other people, and the role o f  P lato in teaching m athem at­
ics is greatly exaggerated; because nobody know s for sure w hat w as happening behind the 
«w alls» o f  the Academ y. The only thing w e know  is that P lato taught something. I f  he taught 
dialectics, it is necessary to  note that it w as a certain m ethod, a special art o f  understanding «the 
essence o f  any subject», as stated in «The Republic» (VII, 532a).
As a recom m endation for teaching philosophy and for philosophical treatm ent o f  things 
in general, Plato, i f  w e follow  his conception o f  dialectics, put forw ards the follow ing idea: not 
to  put any question concerning the studied subject, until the utm ost clarity o f  w hat this studied 
subject is (w hatever it m ay be) is achieved. In «Phaedrus» P lato insists that i f  the interlocutor 
w ants understanding o f  any object to  be successful, he «m ust first m ake a m ethodical division 
and acquire a clear im pression o f  each class» (Phaedrus 263b), in «Sophist» it is claim ed that a 
philosopher - is the one w ho can m ake «the division o f  things by classes» (Soph. 253d). In 
«Philebus» P lato says that the ready-m ade answ ers to  the questions concerning the tru th  do not 
allow  revealing the nature o f  reality . P lato asserts that before for no particular reasons one as­
cribes the good to  «w isdom » (ф р о у р а^ ), «know ledge» (sntoxppn) and «intellect» (vou^), one 
m ust figure out first: in w hat correlation are the types o f  know ledge w ith each other, are they 
sim ilar or nor? Only due to  the answ ering these questions one m ay understand w hether every­
thing that w as m entioned deals w ith the good or not.
H ow ever, w hat do philosophy learners perceive as a result o f  long preparation, w hich was 
at the A cadem y? As an answ er I quote P la to ’s statem ent from  the dialogue «The Republic», 
w here he declares: «philosophers are those w ho are capable o f  apprehending that w hich is e ter­
nal and unchanging, w hile those w ho are incapable o f  this» (VI, 484b). The cognition o f  «that 
w hich is eternal and unchanging» is the cognition o f the ideal being.
C laim ing the existence o f  a body w ithout a soul, P lato asks: «Do w e th ink  there is such a 
thing as absolute justice, or not?» (Phaedo 65d). O f  course, w e do. W e also acknow ledge the ex­
istence o f  absolute «beauty» and «goodness» but the essence o f  P lato 's question is not to  m ake 
certain o f  w hether there is the presence o f  acknow ledge. The essence o f  the issue lies in the a f­
firm ation o f  «self» as the sem antic definition o f  the phenom ena o f  beauty, goodness, justice, and 
so on. The w ord аито  («self») in P lato 's texts, i f  does not have a technical m eaning, refers to  the 
description o f  a reality that cannot be understood by perception and w hich gives these phenom e­
na the perfect look. W e see this in «Sym posium »: reference to  the end o f  D io tim a’s speech about 
the m ost beautiful gives an idea o f  w hat is this very ideal area. D iotim a, speaking about 
«beauty», attaches to  this w ord the w ord аито^, em phasizing the «self» o f  the beautiful, un ique­
ness o f  its ow n nature: «аХХ' аото  no GsTov KaXov dbvaino povostds^ KanidsTv» («W hat i f  he 
could behold the divine beauty  itself, in its unique form ?»), (Sym. 211e-212a).
W h a t does P la to  teach ?
W hat is «good», «selfness», «one» and w hat should one do w ith this know ledge? One 
can ju st take these entities as som ething given, and experiencing the trem ulous feelings, akin to 
the m ystical ones, confirm  that these entities are real, and this reality itse lf w ould explain their 
ontological significance. M oreover, m ythological scenes, w hich express the content o f  his p h i­
losophy in a positive light, dom inate P la to ’s dialogues and these scenes often express the m ost 
attractive part o f  P la to ’s philosophy -  stories about the underw orld.
One can try  to  follow  P lato substantively, and try to  understand w hat kind o f  content is 
hidden behind the term  that w ill be called later in the academ ic tradition «the ontology o f Plato». 
The one, as w e understand it from  the dialogue «Parm enides», is ineffable, bu t the possession o f 
this ineffability, the closeness o f  it, has m uch to  offer. Studies o f  the developm ent o f  N eopla to ­
nism , taking into account the im portance o f  the m om ent o f  interpretation o f  «the first hypothe­
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sis» o f  the «Parm enides»6 by Platonists, underline the role o f  «one» as the organizer o f  the w orld 
o f  visible th ings7 8. The one organizes all kinds o f  secondary existence, and this is com bined w ith 
the characteristics o f  «pure» transcendental, hidden and unspeakable.
In this way, w e m ay need to  refer to  a respected Plato' student. Proclus w rote m any com ­
m ents on Plato's work; w e can trust his understanding o f  the teachings o f Plato. Proclus im agined 
pretty well the ineffability o f  «one». There is an im portant Plato's «ontological» statement, a very 
well-known passage: «all the things, which are ever said to exist are sprung from  one and many 
and have inherent in them  the finite and the infinite» (Phil. 16c). Proclus com m ented on this frag-
о
m ent : Plato teaches «the intelligible triads». The first m em ber o f  the triad is «limit», that is «god», 
but it appeared «owing to  the indifferent and the very first god». «Limit» «m easures» and «deter- 
m ines» everything and «hypostatizes» next following gods. «The unlim ited is a persistent pow er o f 
the god, which leads to  appearance o f  all the originative structures and o f  the whole unlim ited- 
ness». B ut «the m ixed» presents the very nature o f  the gods and contains both «the appeared» and 
«the cause», and in «the m ixed» «isolation» o f  the first god is justified.
Further, according to  Proclus, P lato describes degradation o f  the triads: sim ilar to the first 
triad the second triad w ill be intelligible too, bu t it descends from  the second m em ber o f  the first 
triad, and so on. B ut the first triad is the first one am ong the earliest, however, w e should not 
forget about «the very first god», after w ho it comes.
H ow  should a teacher o f  philosophy act: should he believe in this to  the letter? The 
know ledge o f  «the One», o f  P lato 's «selfness» is the know ledge o f  the one, that «determ ines eve­
rything and is deprived o f  all the determ inations, i.e. it is those, that is the very itse lf o f  every 
thing and the very itse lf o f  all the existed, at the same tim e, cultural-typologically  it has an abso­
lutely specific face, and in  it w ithout surprise w e recognize the generally-know n traits o f  the an­
tique genius on the w hole» [Losev, 1994, p. 363]. A nd in this case such know ledge can be 
transm itted to  the follow ing generations.
O r everything, P lato speaks about, should one consider as the m aterial for historico- 
philosophical reflection, or as statem ents given for analytical insight or as som ething else? O n 
the one hand, the practice o f  academ ic collaboration and com m unication, w hich takes place in 
the philosophical environm ent, evokes sensation o f  the necessity o f  negotiations o f  theoretical 
generalizations and o f  way out o f  «the circle», specified by the classical philosophy. B ut on the 
other hand, the idea, that probably w e really have a chance to cognize and transm it «w isdom » as 
«art o f  life» (P. H adot), cannot be rejected com pletely.
A  view  o f  the problem  o f  the P latonic approach to  the reality presented in the book o f  J. 
M oravcsik [M oravcsik, 2000], analyzing the content o f  the categories «appearance» and «reali­
ty» through the philosophy o f  Plato, is interesting in that the author draw s attention to  the specif­
ics o f  the cognitive elem ent in P lato 's relation to  reality. From  this book w e learn that according 
to Plato, understanding o f  the essence o f  things does not m ean accum ulating an inform ation, or 
to be arm ed w ith lots o f  know ledge about different things. K now ing som ething, according to 
Plato, does not m ean cognize an object in a varying degree. The m ost im portant in the cognitive 
processis a contribution to  the perception o f  the conditions under w hich understanding o f  the 
truth is possible. This study o f  the conditions o f  receiving cognition m akes P lato 's doctrine o f 
know ledge «realistic»; only on the basis o f  these conditions, one can count on the full and final 
understanding o f  the reality. P lato 's theory o f  ideas is not intended to  justify  the reality, bu t to  be
6 Conclusions from this «hypothesis»: Parm. 141е-142с.7
A number of Losev’s works is devoted to the rationale of this state. Repeating the logic of philosophers 
and the Neoplatonists, Losev sees in the «dialectic» in the «Parmenides» real and meaningful disclosure of the an­
swer to the question of why the visible universe has exactly that appearance what it has. The logical-dialectical 
scheme of «Parmenides» contains, in his opinion, descriptions of the relations between the ideal, forming being and 
the «empirical being», which are can be described as relations between organizing principle and the whole reality, 
that is subordinated to this principle.
8 Plat. Teol. III, 45.
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a condition, the th inking field, through w hichan explanation o f  reality and access to the real ob ­
jec ts  come.
G. D eleuze in his «Logic o f  Sense» does not assum e P la to ’s ideas for philosophical anal­
ysis directly. There is no such problem : to give som e positive know ledge about the ideas them ­
selves, to talk  about w hat they represent. D eleuze uses the ideas o f  P lato to denote the «pure 
form ation», w hich captures the duality o f  things, and w hich is related to  the self-identity and 
other conditions, w hich w ere interesting for Deleuze. This is the another exam ple o f  how  the P la ­
to ' s dialogues act as a m ental background, experim ental fields, w here com pletely different text 
will be built on the second floor.
Anyway, the position o f  Plato, concluded that the research object is the object which is 
gradually discovered in the process o f philosophizing, should aim a m odern philosopher on step- 
by-step research description o f  the m ovem ent to conceptual conclusion, to  identify the conditions 
o f  getting knowledge, on the details and particular, containing an invaluable am ount o f new 
knowledge. This position also opposes the attempts o f  reducing all the tex t volum e to the presenta­
tion o f  general ideas, theoretical schemes, universal judgm ents, rude generalizations, ready 
knowledge. According to  Plato, the answers to the questions about the truth do not allow to reveal 
the nature o f  reality. In addition, generalizations can lead to superficial, m eaningless, «disputa­
tious» reasoning, from the appearance o f  which he w arned everyone w ho w ants to do philosophy.
С п и со к  л и т е р а т у р ы  
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